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Introduction
A relatively recent review of the work done in the field of corporate finance over the last twenty five years ends with the conclusion that one of the biggest challenges facing theorists and empiricists alike is the valuation of "firms whose major asset consists of human rather than physical capital, prominent examples being in computer software and film production, […] for the paradigm example underlying most of our theoretical models is the manufacturing firm which dominated the growth of the economy around mid-century" 1 . More generally the technologies used by firms have evolved, as the industry groups represented in the S&P500, ever more heavily weighted towards pharmaceutical, banking, media and technology firms, testify. In particular, we believe that alongside human capital, the speed at which uncertainty is resolved for those firms/industries has become a more important factor of their investment policy and the yield demanded on their debt.
The relevance of the concept of temporal resolution of uncertainty (in the sequel: TRU) for corporate finance becomes intuitive as soon as one realizes that both sides of the balance sheet will depend heavily on it: the capital budgeting process will have to take into account whether more uncertainty affects short-term or long-term cash flows to figure out the right discount rates to use as well as the extent to which incoming information may change expectations about these cash flows. This will in turn determine the extent to which a firm can rely on debt as well as the type of debt it will use 2 . But the very nature of the firm's liabilities will affect its investment policy. This is certainly even more the case when we move from manufacturing firms to technology and human capital intensive firms, whose operations are not only arguably more risky, but also suffer from a more delayed resolution of uncertainty.
Indeed, a large strand of the corporate finance literature has focused on so-called "agency" problems: an agent/manager may undertake actions that are suboptimal from the principal's point of view. This may be due to a difference in their respective utilities or their information sets and affects as well the level as the nature of the investment. For instance, a shareholder-aligned manager may decide not to undertake a valuable investment project because proceeds have to be shared with bondholders (especially in the states of nature where the firm is barely solvent) and decide to strategically default instead (see Myers (1977) ). Alternatively, the manager may play on the riskiness of the firm's investments. She may invest in assets that are too risky (or even in negative-NPV projects) to maximize the option value of equity (see for instance Jensen and Meckling (1976) ) or, conversely, invest too conservatively. This would be the case if she is privately aware of growth options that would be lost in case of default (see Brito and John (2002) ) or if she is not totally shareholder-aligned and is concerned about the loss of private benefits of control or reputation (especially if it is hard to tell whether a firm went bankrupt because of bad luck or bad management). However, the agency literature has focused on how 1 Brennan (1995) , p.18.
2 See Goswami, Noe and Rebello (1995) for an attempt to design the type of debt a firm should use depending on whether more uncertainty surrounds short-term or long-term cash flows.
these agency games vary depending on concrete characteristics of the firm (bankruptcy costs, debt-related tax shields, level of tangible assets etc.) in order to obtain testable empirical implications and has left the effect of some more abstract concepts, such as temporal resolution of uncertainty, a yet… unresolved issue.
On the other hand, the literature dealing with temporal resolution of uncertainty looks at the firm as a black box producing cash flows. For instance, the pioneering work by Epstein and Turnbull (1980) showed that when the uncertainty about a cash flow is resolved earlier (in the sense that more information is available about it at an intermediate date), the return demanded by investors who have a CARA utility function in an environment where returns are multivariate normal is larger than the riskless rate: the expected release of information has rendered the holdings risky. However, Epstein and Turnbull's discussion is restricted to studying the effect of temporal resolution of uncertainty on equilibrium market prices and on the optimal production of information. In their model, after the manager has conducted the experiment that yields some early resolution of uncertainty, "the firm communicates the [result of the experiment] truthfully" and "no production decisions are taken after the experiment results become known" (p. 628). They are aware that there may be "a moral hazard in that actions by management may not be in the best interest of the owners and will decrease the market value of their holding"
and that the firm may release spurious information, but consider that insisting upon monitoring of managerial activities will minimize the associated costs.
Nabar, Stapleton and Subrahmanyam (1988) took the issue into the realm of corporate finance by studying how the value of corporate debt (and hence its yield) is affected when the speed of uncertainty resolution varies.
However, their model assumes a context in which "the assets of the firm are in place and future risky investment decisions have already been taken by the firm" (p. 224). As a consequence, Modigliani and Miller's (1958) Capital Structure Irrelevance Theorem still holds and "hence the leverage employed by the firm merely determines the split of total value between debt and equity and not the total value of the firm itself" (p. 225).
Their model thus ignores agency problems and their effect on debt value and investment policy.
There have been a couple of articles looking at agency problems under the light of temporal resolution of uncertainty (see John (1987) and John and Ronen (1990) ). They present a relatively rigid framework (two possible outcomes for the investment project and a manager's information set consisting of only the probability of the high outcome and/or its magnitude) and thus can only offer the conclusion that "the financing choices and the investment policy can be materially affected by the timing of financing and investment vis-à-vis crucial resolutions of uncertainty in the underlying technology" 3 . In particular, the relation between the speed of resolution of uncertainty and corporate bond yields is not studied. More generally, we don't believe any research has been done that allows the pattern of TRU to evolve along a continuous range and derives empirical implications on investment policy and corporate debt yields in an asymmetric information/agency games framework. We set out to fill this gap.
be bivariate normally distributed with the return available on the risky technology and hence gives some information to the manager about the probabilistic properties of the latter (we will denote ρ m the correlation between X 1 and θ). Based on the observation of a particular realization x 1 , the manager, a Bayesian decision maker, allocates her cash between the risky technology (in which she invests a fraction Q) and riskless
Treasury bills in which she puts the remainder I-Q. At the time the manager observes the signal X 1 , outsiders observe a noisy version of it, Y 1 =X 1 +ε, where ε~2 (0, ) N ε σ is white noise, independent of X 1 and θ; we will denote ρ b the correlation between Y 1 and θ).
• At t=2, the realization of the risky technology θ is revealed to everybody and the firm is liquidated (proceeds are distributed according to the prewritten financial agreement).
The signal X 1 could be the result of a performance test on a prototype or a marketing survey; alternatively, it could be a t=1 cash flow, but we would have to impose the restriction that it is not contractible upon (or at least not verifiable by an outside court). We further assume that dividends are not allowed, in which case the shareholder-aligned manager would distribute as much as possible at t=1. Contracts can only be written (and enforced) based on the realization y 1 of the noisy signal Y 1 , observable by everybody, not based on the realization x 1 of the more precise signal X 1 , observed only by the manager. This asymmetry of information is at the heart of the agency problem and creates a problem of incomplete contracting in relation to the manager's investment choices. Our model can be summarized schematically as in Figure 1 .
[Insert Figure 1 here] "Temporal resolution of uncertainty" is defined in much the same way as in Epstein and Turnbull (1980) : we say that the more (less) informative the experiment concerning the final cash flows is, the earlier (later) the prior uncertainty about cash flows is resolved. Epstein and Turnbull (1980) show that in the case of jointly normal distributions, the correlation coefficient is a sufficient statistic for the informativeness of the experiment: an experiment X is said to be more informative about θ than about θ' if corr(X,θ)≥corr(X,θ'). This role of ρ is best seen if we consider the proportion of the uncertainty of θ that is resolved by observing X 1 or Y 1 :
Hence, we shall say that there is earlier resolution of uncertainty the larger (in absolute value) ρ, the correlation coefficient between the signal observed and θ.
In other words, if ρ is large, there is little more to be learnt at t=2 and most of the uncertainty has indeed been resolved in the first period. If ρ is low, most of the uncertainty is shifted towards the second period. We will consider only positive values of ρ, since we look at it as the correlation coefficient between θ and a random variable that is perfectly correlated to the signal and which tells you how informative this signal is about θ (for instance, a signal that has, say, a -0.9 correlation with θ would be extremely informative; in our model, this case would be summarized with ρ=0.9).
We need here to clarify a few assumptions of our model:
• Assumption 1: Investors are risk-neutral. This stems either from the absence of arbitrage (ensuring the existence of a risk-neutral measure), or from the combination of certain preferences and distribution properties for the underlying variables 6 . As a consequence, the firm's securities are priced on the basis of the relevant conditional expectation of the cash flows (with respect to the state price density function).
• Assumption 2: The firm has two types of marketed claims outstanding, debt and equity. The debt has the form of a pure discount bond of promised payment F which matures at t=2. Note that since the return on the investment is normally distributed, it has a positive probability of being arbitrarily negative and therefore any amount of outstanding debt is risky. Once the final cash flow is realized, the firm is obliged to pay debt claims, if possible. If the cash flow is insufficient to meet debt obligations, the firm goes bankrupt and its assets are turned over to bondholders. We will abstain from considering bankruptcy costs or the tax advantage of debt financing.
• Assumption 3: It is not possible for the manager to issue further debt at t=1 after observing the result of the experiment, nor is it allowed to invest a negative amount in the risky project, putting the proceeds in the riskfree asset ("short-selling" the risky project). We also assume that E(θ)>r 2 .
• Assumption 4: The information available to the manager at t=1 is restricted to a signal X 1 7 .
• Assumption 5: The manager acts to maximize the wealth of current shareholders (i.e., under asymmetric information, the true value of their claims conditional on the private information). In a rational expectations equilibrium, debtholders as well as stockholders will correctly anticipate, at t=0, the effect of debt structure and temporal resolution of uncertainty on the chosen investment strategy and the effect of this strategy on security pricing; in consequence, the entrepreneur bears the agency costs of debt when he sells securities at t=0. Note here that we implicitly assume that outsiders have all the information about the firm's characteristics (in particular about the firm's investment opportunity set) and insiders' preferences (insiders' optimal private actions are common knowledge), which is necessary for them to rationally price their claims.
6 Stapleton and Subrahmanyam (1984) show that in a discrete time framework, the combinations of negative exponential (CARA) utilities and normally distributed variables, or power (CRRA or HARA) utilities and lognormally distributed variables, yield a risk-neutral valuation relationship (RNVR) after a shift of the original parameters. In our model, the reader can consider that we look at the case where investors display constant absolute risk-aversion and returns are normal, but that all results are derived with parameters already shifted in such a way as to be able to use the tools of risk-neutral valuation.
See also Ross (1978) for why we do not lose any generality assuming risk neutrality if markets are "reasonably complete".
A few comments on those assumptions are necessary. Assumption 2 may not be as innocuous as it seems. In our model, the outcome of the risky project may be arbitrarily negative. Since in the United States (as in most developed countries) equity has limited liability, we have to introduce a third claim. This claim is a purely negative one, borne by the government: if the firm faces hard times (i.e. a negative realization of θ), the government steps in to absorb the negative result (as, for instance, in the case of an environmental catastrophe where the state has to bear the cleanup costs) 8 . We will refer to the combined value of debt and equity as the "market value of the firm" since this is the amount for which the firm can be sold to the public at t=0. If we add to this the negative claim, we'll refer to it as the "social value of the firm".
Assumption 3 tells us that the firm chooses to issue outside claims (debt in our case) when it is common knowledge that there is no asymmetric information between the manager of the firm and outsiders. It is not clear whether it would be possible at all to issue further debt (no matter at what rate), when asymmetric information may lead to a "lemons" problem (see Akerlof (1970) ). This is an issue we are considering in a companion paper.
Finally, Assumption 5 clarifies what is known by everybody and what is private information: apart from the realization x 1 that only the manager observes, everything else is publicly known; in particular: ρ m , the speed of resolution of uncertainty for the particular firm/industry, E(θ), Var(θ), E(X 1 ), Var(X 1 ) and all other parameters, as well as the preferences of the manager, the firm's characteristics and the fact that the manager privately observes x 1 , thus enabling bondholders to rationally price their claim. All other assumptions are standard and do not affect crucially our results.
The problem here is threefold. First of all, we would like to determine to what extent the informativeness of the signal observed by the manager before making the investment decision will affect her deviation from the optimal investment policy. Secondly, we set out to endogenously characterize the optimal contracts to limit such deviations. And finally, the resulting yield premium demanded on corporate debt has to be evaluated.
Solving the Problem

Some Preliminary Results
In the framework outlined above, it can be shown that the signal observed by outsiders at t=1 (defined as X 1 plus white noise) is also bivariate normally distributed with the outcome of the risky technology, although it is less informative about θ than X 1 : Proof: σ or the smaller ρ XY , the larger the extent of asymmetric information. In the sequel, we'll mainly do comparative statics with respect to ρ XY , since we have a more intuitive feeling for it (see next paragraph), and since it does not need to be scaled (as opposed to ε σ ).
A useful way to think about it is as follows: ρ m is the informativeness of the manager's signal and is the true speed of temporal resolution of uncertainty in a given firm/industry/market. It therefore gives us interindustry/market comparative statics (once we have controlled for the intrinsic project risk σ θ ). However, within a given industry/market, disclosure requirements vary (due to size differences or the stock exchange on which a stock is traded) and therefore outsiders will be more or less able to monitor actions by insiders. Typically, large firms listed on the NYSE will have stricter disclosure requirements (larger ρ XY ) than smaller firms listed on the NASDAQ, leaving outsiders with a higher "signal precision" ρ b
9
. This ρ b cannot, however, be seen as a measure 9 The term "disclosure requirements" encompasses only the verifiable information the manager releases. Big firms will probably enjoy fewer information asymmetries because more analysts follow them rather than due to significant differences in disclosure requirements between, say, the NYSE and the NASDAQ markets. Alternatively, our problem can be seen as looking at different firms within the same industry, but differing along two dimensions: the speed at which the uncertainty surrounding their operations is resolved (as measured by ρ m ) and the extent of information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders (measured by ρ XY ).
of the speed at which uncertainty is resolved, since it is the correlation coefficient between the return on the risky technology θ and a signal which can be more or less noisy irrespective of the industry (or firm) considered; ρ b thus measures the speed of resolution of uncertainty "tainted" by asymmetric information. Outsiders, who know the value of ρ m (but do not observe x 1 ), are aware that the ρ b based on which they will make decisions is only the product of ρ m and ρ XY and compute true values for financial claims using ρ m (which is common knowledge). In order to later understand the general solution to the problem, as well as notations, we will now present the case where ρ XY =0. This corresponds to the case where outsiders are fed no information whatsoever (or an infinitely noisy, therefore irrelevant, information). We'll assume that outsiders do not write any contract ex-ante and will show in a later section, when we look at the general case, that they would not even if they could: contracting is suboptimal when the extent of asymmetric information is too large.
Example: the Opaque Firm
The Firm's Investment Policy
At t=1, the manager of a levered firm, subject to a managerial contract that perfectly aligns her incentives with shareholder interests, will seek to
where (w) + stands for max(w,0). For an all-equity firm, the face value of the debt F has to be replaced by zero, in which case the objective function above represents the firm-value maximizing (first-best) investment policy.
More generally, the payoff to the shareholders is positive if and only if Qθ+(I-Q)r 2 >F or θ≥[F-(I-Q)r 2 ]/Q≡θ * (note here the circularity of the problem: θ * will determine the shareholders' optimal Q, but Q enters the formula for θ * ). If the manager chooses to invest very little money in the risky technology (Q tends to 0), two possible cases arise: i) if Ir 2 ≥F, θ * tends to -∞: the firm will be solvent in all states of nature since its final wealth will be Ir 2 , which is enough to cover its debt obligation of F; ii) if Ir 2 <F, θ * tends to +∞: the firm will never be solvent since its final wealth, Ir 2 , is insufficient to cover its debt obligation. Since no bank or individual would lend money with a face value greater than Ir 2 to our firm (which, in order to be solvent, would have to invest a positive Q in the risky technology, no matter how negative x 1 is, since investing in the risky technology is the only way to have a positive probability of avoiding bankruptcy), we shall assume that F≤Ir 2 . The fact that θ The problem then becomes, denoting P(θ|X 1 ) the probability distribution function of θ conditional on X 1 ,
where we have underscored the dependence of this indirect utility function on ρ m and the particular realization x 1 observed at t=1. It is shown in Appendix 1 that this is equivalent to maximizing the following expression over Q∈ [0,I] : The expression (2) is the expected value as of t=1 of the cash flows to be received by shareholders at t=2. It has to be discounted at the riskless rate r 2 to yield the share price at t=1, as a function of the quantity invested Q, the particular "state of the world" x 1 and the particular pattern of resolution of uncertainty (ρ m shows up as well in E(θ|X 1 =x 1 ) as in var(θ|X 1 =x 1 )). Expression (2) can be interpreted as follows: the first term tells us that the shareholders get whatever is left of the cash flows to the firm after bondholders have been repaid if the firm is solvent (which happens with a probability of
); the second term tells us that shareholders should be concerned not only with whether they finish "in-the-money", but by how much (the firm is now long an asset that bears a normal return and thus has to deal with this convexity feature).
It is shown in Appendix 1 that the function U(Q,ρ m ,x 1 ,F) is convex, leading to a corner solution. Whether Q=0 or Q=I will depend on the particular x 1 observed by the manager: since
investing everything in riskless bills may yield a higher value for the objective function for low values of x 1 . We now characterize the manager's investment policy.
Characterizing the Shareholder-Aligned Manager's Risk-Shifting Incentives
A risk-shifting (overinvestment) region is defined as a range of x 1 values for which a levered firm will invest in the risky venture whereas an all-equity firm will prefer to put the money into riskless bills, i.e. values of x 1 for which U(I,ρ m ,x 1 ,F)>U(0,ρ m ,x 1 ,F) whereas U(I,ρ m ,x 1 ,0) ≤U(0,ρ m ,x 1 ,0). The first task is to characterize the values of x 1 for which the firm decides to invest in the risky technology: Stiglitz (1970, 1971) sense, than the t=2 cash flow distribution from the investment policy
ii) The ex-ante probability of investing in the risky technology is increasing in the amount of outstanding debt F; in particular, it is greater for a levered firm than for an all-equity one.
iii) F X X , a strictly larger quantity will be invested in the risky technology by the levered firm, raising the variance of the final cash flows (while for any
ii) The ex-ante (t=0) probability that a firm with an investment policy
iii) Since [Insert Figure 2 here]
Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty and Risk-Shifting Incentives
Our model therefore confirms that the distortion in the investment policy of a shareholder-aligned manager becomes more pronounced as the amount of debt outstanding increases. However, a far more interesting task is to find out how risk-shifting incentives vary with the pattern of temporal resolution of uncertainty ρ m . Several results will be proven here. 
This yields our first directly testable implication: firms operating in industries where uncertainty is resolved later will have more risky operations. Even when the intrinsic risk of a project (σ θ ) is held constant (i.e. comparing two firms in the same industry), the firm for which uncertainty is resolved later will invest over a larger X 1 -region than the firm for which uncertainty is resolved earlier. Hence, if a given firm decides to invest for a certain value of x 1 , so will a firm facing more delayed uncertainty. This effect is independent of the fact that firms with later temporal resolution of uncertainty (lower ρ m ) may typically rely more on growth projects, developing a new drug or software, with the risk that a competitor achieves it before them or that a regulatory agency prevents them from selling their product (shift in σ θ ).
Heuristically, this is due to the fact that when ρ m is small, X 1 is less reliable in forecasting θ; hence the manager is ready to take the risk of investing in the risky project even for relatively low values of x 1 , aware that the end result may still turn out to be very decent. The extent of the Bayesian update is small and the manager' beliefs are close to the prior ones, which would lead her to invest (E(θ)>r 2 ). On the contrary, when ρ m is larger, X 1 is more reliable in forecasting θ and a bad signal x 1 is a pretty good indication that the final outcome will be mediocre (the extent of the Bayesian update is larger).
It is interesting to notice that our result is not purely driven by the fact that the manager is faced with lower yielding an investment cutoff that is decreasing in σ θ : the likelihood that the manager will invest in the risky technology is increasing in the ex-ante uncertainty. This is especially true for larger amounts of debt since the cutoff 1 F X is implicitly defined as
The larger F, the larger the proportion of the distribution of
that is discarded (lower tail) because of limited liability, and the larger the expectation over the remaining part of the truncated distribution.
The conclusion is different for a move in ρ m . When ρ m increases, it not only lowers the conditional expectation E(θ|X 1 =x 1 ) for mediocre x 1 's, it also makes the conditional distribution of θ tighter around this lower expectation: the manager is certainly less likely to invest when the signal is reliable and bad, with no upside potential. On the contrary, a lower value of ρ m will both increase the conditional expectation E(θ|X 1 =x 1 ) and the upside potential (fatter upper tail). Hence, given a certain ρ m and σ θ , a "borderline" x 1 will be unacceptable if we increase ρ m but under some circumstances may be acceptable for a lower -or larger -σ θ . We summarize the above discussion in Figure 3 , but refer the reader to Epstein (1980) for more on why a larger ex-ante variance of the distribution of final cash flows and a more delayed resolution of uncertainty do not always yield the same qualitative results.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
The previous result holds for all-equity as well as levered firms. It turns out that it holds for the extent of debtinduced risk-shifting (the difference between 0 1 X and 1 F X , both of which increase with ρ m ) as well:
Theorem 2: The extent of risk shifting
is strictly decreasing in the pattern of TRU ρ m .
Proof: see Appendix 4.
Note that our results are consistent with the existing research predicting that "companies whose value consists primarily of "growth options" as opposed to "assets in place" are likely to find debt financing very costly" (Myers (1977) , p. 161). Intuitively "assets in place" are more numerous in industries where uncertainty is resolved earlier. This paper, however, explicitly uncovers the functional dependence between the pattern of temporal resolution of uncertainty and the investment policy distortions.
It is worth noting that the extent of risk-shifting is continuous as ρ m tends to 1: observing x 1 fully reveals θ and whether the firm is levered or not, the risky project will be chosen if and only if
any lower realization x 1 , and the manager is better off investing in riskless bonds, securing a payoff of Ir 2 -F for shareholders. However, this feature of continuity does not hold when ρ m tends to 0. When ρ m =0, X 1 is irrelevant in forecasting θ and the managers of both the all-equity and the levered firm make a decision based on the unconditional mean, E(θ)>r 2 , and invest in the risky venture regardless of the particular realization x 1 : there is no risk shifting. However, when ρ m tends to 0, it is easily shown that the extent of risk shifting tends to infinity. Hence, there is a discontinuity in the extent of risk shifting in ρ m =0.
However, this does not have any impact on agency costs for two reasons: i) both 0 1 X and 1 F X tend to -∞ as ρ m approaches 0 and for all relevant purposes we can consider that both managers have the same investment policy (investing for all x 1 's). It may be of more relevance to consider the probability of falling in this region,
, which indeed tends to 0; ii) when ρ m is very low, X 1 is of very little relevance for predicting θ and even a significant distortion between the two investment policies would not yield significant ex-ante agency costs (formally,
negative, E(θ|X 1 =x 1 ) will be close to E(θ) for very low ρ m ). shifting is smaller than for lower values of ρ m but causes much more harm since a mediocre x 1 is a more reliable signal that the final realization of θ will indeed be poor. For I=100, r 2 =5%, E(θ)=15%, and σ θ =0.6 (our standard scenario), agency costs represent up to 0.23% of firm value for F=50 (market value of debt/equity ratio: 0.675) and 1.16% for F=75 (market value of D/E ratio: 1.375). This is consistent with Leland (1998) , who finds agency costs ranging from 0.32% to 1.22% of firm value depending on the risk management policy of the firm. The reason why the magnitude of agency costs is modest is that managers do not observe, as opposed to previous studies, any future parameter (e.g. future cash flows in case of success), but a signal that give them some partial information about future cash flows. Hence i) the magnitude of the asymmetric information is much smaller, and ii) if the policy conducted by the manager is much different from the one value-maximizers would choose, it does not ensure in any way that the final outcome of θ will make this deviation of consequence. Our agency costs are also rendered smaller by the fact that we do not consider the costs of financial distress (not only bankruptcy costs but also the impossibility to react freely to strategic moves by competitors if the firm is in the process of reorganization).
Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty and Corporate Debt Yields
Aware that the distribution of terminal cash flows will be less risky (Theorem 1) and that the extent of riskshifting will be lower (Theorem 2), rational bondholders will demand a lower yield (or, equivalently, pay a larger price) for the bonds of a firm operating in a field where uncertainty is resolved earlier. We prove this in Appendix 5, after computing the t=0 value of bonds:
(it is nothing else than the earlier function 1 x B when Q=I),
and r 1 denotes the discount rate to be used from t=0 to t=1 (we would not lose any generality assuming that it is equal to 0). . Bondholders share this benefit with shareholders ("total firm value effect");
ii) as ρ m increases, the extent of risk-shifting decreases (see Theorem 2), and bondholders benefit from a lower deviation from the socially optimal investment policy ("reduction in agency games effect").
Bondholders will demand lower bond yields from a firm with earlier resolution of uncertainty both because of a lower residual risk at the time of the investment decision ("total firm value effect") and because the manager will depart less from the value-maximizing investment policy. Both reasons follow from a later resolution of uncertainty. It however remains an open question whether TRU still has some power explaining the crosssectional variation in yields demanded on corporate bonds, once risk (default risk as well as overall business risk) has been controlled for. A recent empirical investigation by Reisz and Perlich (1999) answers positively, with statistical as well as economic significance. This confirms the results of our simulations: keeping the business risk constant at σ θ =0.6 and setting I=100, r 2 =5% and E(θ)=15%, the yield premium is as large as 383 basis points for F=50 (market debt/equity ratio of 0.675) and 628 basis points for F=75 (market D/E ratio of
Totally differentiating this expression with respect to ρ m (which appears directly as well as indirectly through X 1 F ) yields a positive result (this differentiation is similar to the one in Appendix 5). One can see 0
increase in firm value that the choice by a marginally more informed the manager will bring (marginal value of information).
If our model allowed the manager to buy more information for a certain cost, this increase in marginal value would have to be equated to the marginal cost of buying more information to find the optimal level of information.
Finally, since firm value is increasing in ρ m , it is bounded below by
, this last number being the social value of the firm for ρ m =0. Since in our model E(θ)>r 2 , this lower bound for the firm's value is strictly greater than I/r 1 , the t=0 present value of the I dollars invested at t=1.
The difference can be seen as the "growth options" of the firm (value of the opportunity to invest in a technology with E(θ)>r 2 ). Alternatively, it can be seen as the surplus of the entrepreneur when he sells the firm to outside shareholders and bondholders at t=0. 
. Designing the Optimal Contractual Terms
In the more general case where outsiders observe as of t=1 a meaningful signal Y 1 , it is in the entrepreneur's interest to write covenants as of t=0 when he sells claims to the firm's cash flows. Since he is the one who will bear the ex-ante agency costs of debt as he sells financial claims, his goal is to maximize the sale price of bonds plus the value of the equity he keeps. This is equivalent to saying that he will try to minimize the t=1 deviation from the firm value maximizing investment policy.
Since an investment policy can only be enforced based on verifiable information, outsiders will want to . At first sight, the following contract could be written at t=0: y Y > , the risky technology will be chosen.
• if
, bondholders will let the shareholder-aligned manager do as she pleases.
However, the same result can be achieved by merely stating that the manager is not allowed to invest below a Y is only slightly larger than 1 . Figure 4 shows the two possible cases, i.e. when contracting helps alleviating the manager's suboptimal investment policy and when bondholders cannot reduce the extent of risk-shifting.
[Insert Figure 4 here] Since the precision of the signal is independent of how much debt the firm has issued 16 but risk-shifting becomes more severe the larger the amount of debt outstanding, there may be no improvement at all for relatively small amounts of debt (Y 1 is too noisy an estimate of X 1 ); however, as the proportion of debt in the capital structure increases, outsiders think twice before discarding the information y 1 (X 1 F crosses to the left of 16 This might not be completely true: larger firms are likely to issue more debt, and at the same time, as seen previously, to have stricter disclosure requirements (or to be more closely followed by analysts). The precision of the signal is then increasing in the amount of debt issued. The same is true if more covenants are attached as the level of debt increases. We decide to ignore this for the time being.
Proof: Ill-informed outsiders will be reluctant to contract, well aware that a mediocre y 1 may still be followed by a decent realization of θ. As Y 1 becomes more correlated with X 1 , outsiders become more able (and therefore more willing) to effectively monitor the investment policy of the firm. Section 3.2. (where ρ XY =0) can therefore be seen as dealing with the case where outsiders choose not to contract, given that it is impossible to improve on the manager's choice (
On the Extent of Residual Risk-Shifting After Optimal Contracting
We will here characterize the extent of the residual risk-shifting after optimal contracts have been written. The first step is to show that the benefit at t=1 from contracting, Contracting is more interesting for lower values of ρ m since a levered firm operating in a field where uncertainty is resolved early does not have an investment policy significantly different from its all-equity equivalent. It therefore benefits less, for a fixed level of disclosure requirement ρ XY , from contracting than a firm operating in a field where uncertainty is resolved later and which will have a tendency to risk-shift more significantly. Hence the following corollary:
22 
It is pretty intuitive that the stricter the disclosure requirements, the more each firm/industry benefits from contracting. However, the preceding corollary also states that an increase in ρ XY will bring new industries to contract; these are the industries that were just a little bit too mature (ρ m too high) to benefit from a disclosure of quality ρ XY , but who can gain from writing contracts based on information of quality ρ XY +∆ρ XY . In the limit, when ρ XY tends to 1 (outsiders know as much as insiders), the optimal cutoff 0 1 X can be imposed by bondholders, leaving no residual agency costs: regardless of the amount of debt outstanding and the industry in which it operates, a firm will benefit from contracting. At the opposite end of the spectrum, when ρ XY crosses XY ρ to the left, no firm will benefit from contracting, no matter how large the amount of debt outstanding and regardless of the industry in which it operates. However, for a given level of disclosure requirement ρ XY , we are still left with the equivalent of Theorem 2, once optimal contracts have been written: Partial contracting will thus mitigate risk-shifting, but will not destroy the monotonicity of the extent of riskshifting in the pattern of temporal resolution of uncertainty. Thus all our discussion following Theorem 2 is still valid after bondholders contract as well as they can. We illustrate the case where XY X Y ρ ρ ≥ in Figure 5 .
[Insert Figure 5 here]
On Corporate Debt Yields After Optimal Contracting
Our last task is to investigate how bond yields evolve with temporal resolution of uncertainty after bondholders impose the optimal investment cutoff As before, this stems from two effects: i) the "total firm effect" remains, i.e. the manager can carry out a more "educated" investment policy (alternatively, the residual variance of the risky project is lower), the larger ρ m ;
bondholders share this benefit with shareholders 19 and ii) as ρ m increases, the extent of risk-shifting
decreases (see Theorem 2b), and bondholders benefit from a lower deviation from the socially optimal investment policy.
Finally, bond yields are non-increasing in the strictness of disclosure requirements (see Appendix 7): ; however, the reader should not be worried about nondifferentiability on a set of measure zero. 19 As noted in footnote 12, firm value is increasing in ρ m as long as the cutoff the firm uses for investment is no larger than This feature of our model is consistent with the existing literature on the effect of accounting reports on security prices. Most recently, Duffie and Lando (2001) refine the Leland (1994) model of default and allow for "imperfect information", i.e. outsiders observe only at discrete times a noisy accounting report on the value of assets, and survivorship. Their conclusion is that the zero-coupon credit spread is strictly increasing in the reporting noise level a (see their Figure 8 ). In our model, reports could be not only about accounting data, but also about the investment opportunity set facing the firm (how encouraging a t=1 marketing survey or a prototype test are). Since the quantity that characterizes the noisiness of this report in our model is σ ε , our conclusion is the same as Duffie and Lando's one.
It is worth noting that share prices are decreasing in ρ XY (see Appendix 7): although an increase in ρ XY will increase firm value, this benefits bondholders and hurts shareholders, prevented from investing on the region 0 0 1 1
[ , ] Y X . Equityholders rationally anticipate that their manager won't have total freedom to maximize the value of their claim and price it down accordingly. Note finally that we constrained ρ XY to be the same across industries (hence our intuition that varying ρ XY will yield intra-industry comparative statics). It would be of interest to let ρ XY vary across industries. For instance, by positing that
n≥2, we are in effect imposing the restriction that there is more information asymmetry in industries where uncertainty is resolved later, which seems to be the intuitive case. We looked at the matter but did not report our results, which remain essentially unchanged. 20 or, equivalently, non-decreasing in the amount of asymmetric information.
Empirical Implications and Evidence
Our paper establishes that a shareholder-aligned manager will have more of an incentive to deviate from the value-maximizing investment policy the later the uncertainty surrounding the firm's operations is resolved.
Rational bondholders will anticipate this behavior and demand larger yield premia on the debt of corporations with delayed resolution of uncertainty. Those managers will find it a simple matter to deviate significantly from the optimal investment policy; the results of such a deviation would take years to be noticed by creditors, by which time the value of the firm might be eroded beyond repair. Potential creditors will shy away from a situation they could neither monitor nor control and we would expect the level of debt in such an industry to be lower than in industries where uncertainty is resolved earlier (where the extent of risk-shifting is not only lower, as we have just proved, but also more effectively monitorable). This is reinforced by our Theorem 1, which states that the more delayed the uncertainty is, the larger the variance of distribution of terminal cash flows will be, which further decreases the debt capacity of the firm and increases risk premia.
The main problem will be of course to find a good proxy for the speed at which uncertainty is resolved. The difficulty here is to single out the effect of earlier or later temporal resolution of uncertainty from other effects:
firms that have high R&D expenses or low quit ratios, i.e. firms we heuristically perceived as operating in a field where uncertainty is resolved later, are also firms
• that have more intangible assets and therefore larger expected bankruptcy costs (lower recovery rate on debt);
• with more risky operations and hence a larger probability of bankruptcy;
• the value of which is mainly accounted for by expected future earnings (their current earnings may even be negative), and therefore finding themselves in lower tax brackets (or even collecting tax loss carryforwards).
All these effects contribute in predicting lower debt ratios and higher bond yields for firms operating in fields where uncertainty is resolved later based only on existing theories of bankruptcy costs and tax considerations as determinants of capital structures. For instance, our conclusion that firms in a lower ρ m field should rely less heavily on debt could be merely due to tax effects: progressivity in the tax structure implies that greater volatility in taxable income raises the firm's expected tax liabilities (see Smith and Stulz (1985) ). Firms with later TRU (and hence riskier distributions of final cash flows) will have an incentive to reduce the amount of debt in their capital structure over the range of progressivity. Proxies related to the pattern of TRU that are used in the literature indeed control for other effects as well, such as the importance of growth options in the investment opportunity set of a particular firm; they are for instance the amount of R&D and advertising expenses (scaled by sales or market value of assets) as well as how job-specific the skills of the workers employed by the firm are.
The empirical evidence listed along our paper's implications is to be taken with this in mind. Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim (1984) regress the debt-to-value ratio on non-debt tax shields, R&D and advertising expenses and firm volatility, thereby controlling for the overall volatility of assets as well as for the non debt tax shield due to R&D expenses. The coefficient on R&D and advertising expenses is significantly negative (see their Table III ), as our model predicted (firms that have high R&D expenses are usually firms in a late temporal resolution of uncertainty field and should therefore be more reluctant to issuing debt). They also report a "strong finding of intra-industry similarities in firm leverage ratios and of persistent inter-industry differences" in a way that supports our model: "54% of the cross-sectional variance in firm leverage ratios can be explained by industrial classification, with more variation in mean leverage ratios across industries than there is in firm leverage ratio within industries". Industries like "Drugs and Cosmetics", "Electronics" or "Petroleum
Exploration", which we would heuristically characterize as having later temporal resolution of uncertainty, have significantly lower debt levels than industries like "Steel", "Telephone", "Electricity and Gas Utilities" or "Airlines", which seem to have earlier temporal resolution of uncertainty (see their Table I ; their results are robust to the exclusion of regulated industries). A comparable test is carried out by Long and Malitz (1986) who look at 545 manufacturing firms, grouped into portfolios in order to hold the operating or business risk (as measured by unlevered betas) of all firms constant. The quartile with highest R&D expenses is the one with lowest leverage and the one with lowest R&D expenses is the one with highest leverage. The negative relationship between R&D (and advertising) expenses and leverage remains when the latter is regressed on the former, controlling for the firm systematic and residual risk and non-debt tax shields; these results carry over as well for portfolios as for individual firms.
Titman and Wessels (1988) use a factor-analytic technique, linear structural modeling, that mitigates the measurement problem encountered when working with proxy variables. They report that firms that are more "unique" tend to have lower debt/equity ratios. They define "uniqueness" as higher R&D and advertising expenses and lower quit ratios ("firms that sell products with close substitutes are likely to do less research and development since their innovations can be more easily duplicated" whereas "firms with relatively unique products are expected to advertise more and, in general, spend more in promoting and selling their products" and "employ workers with high levels of job-specific human capital who will thus find it costly to leave their jobs" 21 ). Intuition dictates us that firms that operate in an industry where uncertainty is resolved late are, in a Titman and Wessels sense, more "unique" 22 and in that sense our model is supported by their empirical evidence (for evidence concerning the Japanese market, see Kester (1986) and Bronte (1982) ).
21 p. 5. They also control for the tax deductibility of R&D and some selling expenses. Titman (1984) also finds that "firms that can potentially impose high costs on their customers, workers and suppliers in the event of liquidation have lower debt ratios". This definition corresponds, once more heuristically, to our perception of a late temporal resolution of uncertainty pattern. 22 As, for instance, computer or pharmaceutical firms, whereas firms that operate in a field where uncertainty is resolved earlier tend to offer products that are more substitutable and less characteristic of a given firm and to rely less heavily on human capital.
If firms operating in an environment where uncertainty is resolved late (low ρ m ) have already decided to take on debt (because insiders could not bring enough capital of their own or because the opportunity cost of inside funds or outside equity are even higher), we should see more representatives of creditors (bondholders or lending banks) sitting on the board of directors and more covenants in the bond contract--so as to prevent shareholders from indulging too much in their risk shifting incentives --than for firms operating in a higher ρ m environment (see Theorem 4). Now, since the latter will typically have more risky debt outstanding, tests should control for it and investigate whether low ρ m firms have more creditors on the board of directors and more debt covenants per dollar lent. Another solution to the risk-shifting problem may be to shorten debt maturity for those firms, rendering suboptimal investment by a shareholder-aligned manager more difficult. This is also in the best interest of the firms with most delayed resolution of uncertainty, since it may be able to refinance on better terms at the intermediate date.
We therefore expect firms with more delayed resolution of uncertainty to issue shorter debt. Barclay and Smith (1995) finds supporting evidence in favor of this hypothesis (see also Stohs and Mauer (1996) and Guedes and Opler (1996) ).
We finally address here the empirical implication about bond yields: bondholders, rationally anticipating riskshifting incentives, will demand a higher yield from a corporation in a low ρ m industry than from a corporation in a high ρ m field (Theorems 3 and 3b). Here, some work has been done, investigating whether the pattern of temporal resolution of uncertainty has an effect on bond yields, once the effect of classical determinants has been singled out. Reisz and Perlich (1999) design three direct proxies for TRU, based on earnings forecasts and realizations. They are i) the time-series correlation between forecasted earnings and realized earnings, ii) the root mean square error of forecasts and ii) the dispersion in the earnings forecasts across analysts. These proxies try to estimate how much more difficult it is to forecast the long-term than it is to forecast the short term: a lumber company, say, will know almost as much about the longer-term as about the short-term, which is certainly not true for a company with delayed resolution of uncertainty. Reisz and Perlich (1999) find that indeed TRU still has some power in explaining cross-sectional variation in bonds yields once risk is controlled for. A firm in the last decile (late resolution) will have to offer up to 15.6 basis points more than a firm in the first decile (early resolution), ceteris paribus. Moreover, firms with more delayed resolution of uncertainty will have to offer increasingly larger yields the longer the bonds they issue: the maturity premium is monotonic in the pattern of TRU. They also find that although TRU is "priced" by the market, it is ignored by rating agencies in their grading process.
All of the above empirical implications should be mitigated when the existing regulation enforces verifiable disclosure requirements. In particular, this means that larger firms (or, more generally, firms listed on a stock exchange enforcing stricter disclosure regulations) should display a lower extent of risk-shifting than smaller firms and should get away with lower yield premia 23 .
As pointed out earlier, most of these empirical implications would have been achieved by "classical" corporate finance model based on bankruptcy and tax considerations. Moreover, most of the existing empirical evidence use proxies closely related to these factors and to the extent of growth opportunities in the firm's investment opportunity set. However, this does not undermine the validity of our theoretical model and its empirical implications: we come to the same conclusions as existing theories of bankruptcy costs and tax considerations, but without even considering these effects, therefore in effect singling out the effect of temporal resolution of uncertainty on investment policies and bond yields: we offer but one new element of explanation to the existing empirical evidence, to be added to the aforementioned consideration in further studies to acquire a fuller understanding of the available empirical evidence.
Conclusion
In the tradition of papers dealing with the interactions between product markets and financial decisions, we argued that a firm's financial decisions cannot be independent of how quickly the uncertainty surrounding the firm's operations is resolved. Our paper's innovation is to show that firms for which uncertainty will be resolved later will suffer far more from the risk-shifting tendencies of a shareholder-aligned manager. As a result, the yield premium demanded on corporate bonds will be larger the later the uncertainty is resolved. This is mitigated when outsiders contract as well as they can based on the observation of a noisy signal, but the qualitative conclusions remain the same.
The fact that firm value and bond prices are larger the earlier the uncertainty is resolved does not, however, invalidate Ross' (1989) theory of "resolution irrelevancy". In our model, the difference in prices is due to the anticipation of different managerial behaviors that can lead to different cash flows. In Ross' words, changing the pattern of temporal resolution of uncertainty alters the no-arbitrage martingale pricing operator (which is equivalent to changing the state space spanning). As a result, risk-aversion is not even necessary for the speed of resolution of uncertainty to affect security prices.
We abstracted in our model from considering the different benefits of debt (tax deductibility of interest, disciplinary and signaling role of debt) as well as agency costs of equity. A more general model should include all of these in order to determine a firm's optimal capital structure (if it exists at all!). However, these benefits and costs cannot be traded off against each other independently of the firm's pattern of temporal resolution of 23 With the problem that size may proxy for the liquidity of the firm's bonds as well.
uncertainty, upon which the optimal capital structure of the firm will depend. Further work should therefore investigate the optimal financing of different projects based on how quickly the uncertainty underlying their cash flows is resolved. This encompasses as well the nature of the claims to be used as their maturity: a richer menu of contractual forms for outside claims (for instance convertible debt) should be introduced. The model could be posited in a dynamic multiperiod framework and would investigate whether there is an optimal timing for raising money, in the sense of minimizing ex-ante agency costs as a function of the firm's pattern of TRU. Alternatively, it could try to explain the cross-sectional differences in dividend policies and add a "temporal" explanation to why mature firms differ markedly in this respect from growth firms.
Another avenue for future research is to investigate how the compensation package offered to the top officers of levered corporations should depend on the pattern of resolution of uncertainty surrounding the firm's operations 24 . Two contradicting intuitions are at play here: on the one hand, a manager should be compensated based on results. In a firm with more delayed resolution of uncertainty, this means delaying the manager's compensation, in the sense that more equity-like components (i.e. bonus, shares, and options) should be used. On the other hand, the compensation package should try to disalign the manager to mitigate the monotonic riskshifting incentives we have uncovered in this paper (this will be easier in a market with substantial reputation costs for repeated suboptimal investment decisions). Hence, future research should not only add an element of explanation to the wide differences in managerial compensation across industries, but also suggest a way of driving managerial decisions closer to the optimal investment choices as a function of the industry in which the firm operates. 24 Keeping in mind that the manager may not be shareholder-aligned in the first place. This may be due, for instance, to the fact that the executive's time horizon is relatively short while the value of the stock is the present value of dividends stretching to infinity.
Computing the Objective Function and its First and Second Derivatives
We refer the reader to Epstein and Turnbull's (1980) Appendix 1, p.640, for a reminder on multivariate normal distributions. We'll just state the following result: if two scalar random variables X 1 and θ are jointly normally distributed, then the distribution of θ conditional on X 1 is also normal with the following parameters:
(it is a function of a particular realization x 1 , hence the superscript), a final arrangement yields expression (2) in the text, from which
which can be negative for sufficiently low values of Q and x 1 (
Differentiating this once more yields:
Proof of Lemmas 1 and 2
The manager of a levered firm compares U(I,ρ m ,x 1 ,F) with U(0,ρ m ,x 1 ,F) in deciding whether to invest or not. We 
NB: conditional on investing in the risky technology following a particular observation x 1 ,
is the t=1 probability of the final cash flow Iθ exceeding the promised debt payment F, i.e. the probability of solvency at t=2:
Differentiating ∆U(ρ m ,x 1 ,F) with respect to x 1 yields:
Therefore ∆U(ρ m ,x 1 ,F) is strictly increasing in x 1 . Given that 
Proof of Theorem 1
We will prove here that the earlier the temporal resolution of uncertainty (i.e. the larger ρ m ), the larger the cutoff value 0 1 X (resp. 1 
and combining equations (A3) and (A6) we get:
To prove that this expression is positive, it suffices to show that 1
for all values of F. For that purpose, we introduce the quantity X . It is the cutoff used by a manager who tries to
û (social value of the firm, including the responsibility to face a θ<0) and would therefore invest whenever E(θ|X 1 )≥r 2 . Since
for all F∈[0,Ir 2 ), in particular for F=0, the manager of our all-equity firm still overinvests compared to the social optimum due to limited liability.
Finally, we can prove, using the same steps as above, that
which is negative since 1 1 F X X < . This will be useful when we consider outside contracts based on the signal Y 1 .
Proof of Theorem 2
We will prove here that the earlier uncertainty is resolved (i.e. the larger ρ m ), the lower the extent of risk shifting 0 1 1 
(1 ) ( ) ( )
where we took the expression for ∂X 1 F /∂F from (A4) and
It now suffices to remember that, by definition of 1
see that the expression above is positive. ÿ
Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty and Corporate Debt Yields
We will here price the bonds of the firm in terms of an arbitrary X 1 -cutoff ξ for the sake of generality (when considering partial contracting, we'll use an X 1 -cutoff different from 1 F X ).
for all x 1 ; once more, it is obvious from the derivation that
is nothing else than the t=1 probability of being solvent and that
is the probability of θ being positive, both conditional on investing in the risky technology.
NB: note that the next-to-last line in the expression for B 1 (ρ m ,F,x 1 ) tells us that at t=1 bondholders expect the firm to be solvent (and to receive F) with probability 1 ( )
and believe that with a probability of
A C Φ −Φ the firm will not be solvent but still have positive value, in which case they will take over, receiving on average IE(θ|X 1 =x 1 ); the last term is a convexity adjustment.
M So as of t=0, the bond price is equal to:
as stated in the text.
Since the debt has the form of a zero-coupon bond, we define the per period yield premium demanded on the debt as 1 2 0 ( , , ) m F r r B F ρ ξ -1 (bonds in our model have a maturity of two periods). Proving that this yield 25 Since the return on the risky technology is normally distributed, it can assume an arbitrarily negative value. As stated in the text, we consider in that case that the society at large has to bear the consequences of a negative realization of θ (product liability suit, environmental catastrophe etc.). However, we can choose the parameters so as to make the probability of a negative cash flow, conditional on having invested in the risky technology,
With our parameters (E(θ)=1.15, σ θ =0.6), it is never larger than 2.76% for any value of ρ m .
premium is decreasing in ρ m is therefore equivalent to proving that bond prices are increasing in ρ m . Now, from 
denotes the probability density function of X 1 taken in 1 x ξ = and, as before, the subscript ξ on A and C means that these expressions are also taken in 1 x ξ = . Here, we need to come back to our particular case where the cutoff is 1 F X and remember that
• the functions :
are increasing in x; hence 0 1 1 
and the derivative (A9) becomes strictly greater than: Using equations (15) and (26) from Carr and Rubinstein (1995) to integrate the above normals and simplifying, the above expression is equal to ( )
Note that when ρ m tends to 1, the manager of a levered firm adopts the same cutoff policy as the manager of an all-equity firm. It can be shown that 
Finally, since 
Now, since the function : ρ m after optimal contracting; equivalently, the yield premium demanded is lower the quicker the uncertainty is resolved. ÿ
OOOOOO
It can also be shown that this yield premium is non-increasing in ρ XY , the accuracy of the information Y 1 available to outsiders. As before, we will do that through looking at comparative statics involving bond prices: the region where bond yields are strictly decreasing in ρ XY expands. 27 As we noted in the text, shareholders will really invest for all realizations of X 1 greater than 0 1 1 Y ε − . But since bondholders do not observe ε 1 , they will price securities using E(ε)=0 for ε 1 .
Finally, the price of the equity S 0 (ρ m ,F,ξ) can be expressed as the difference between the market value of the firm (see footnote 12), also increasing in ρ XY , and the price of bonds (A8): Figure 1 The maximum ρ m for which contracting still presents benefits when F=50, r 2 =1.05, and E(θ)=1.15
